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More than a decade ago, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
execution of the mentally retarded under the Eighth Amendment of the
United States constitution.' It is estimated that from July of 1976'
through February of 1998, the United States executed at least thirty-four
mentally retarded people.3 Between twelve and twenty percent of current
death row inmates are mentally retarded.4 As the pace of executions
quickens,5 more mentally retarded individuals will be executed.
Law Clerk to the Honorable Bana Roberts, Federal Magistrate for the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma; B.A., University of Wisconsin 1982; J.D., Tulane Law School 1987.
I.
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that the
Court "cannot conclude today that the Eighth Amendment precludes the execution of any mentally
retarded person . . simply by virtue of his or her mental retardation alone"). The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
2.
On July 2, 1976, the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty as a constitutional form
of punishment. See Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). For a general discussion of Gregg and its companion
cases, see Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth. Report Regnrrling Itt~plenret~tntiot~
of tile Atnericnl~
Bnr Associntiott S Recomnlendntions nnd Resol~rtionsCoi~cerllingtlte Dent11 Pel~nltynrtd Cnllirlg
for n Morntori~rnton Execlrtions, 4 GEO. J . ON FIGHTING
POVERTY3, 7-9 (1996); RANDALL
COYNE& LYNENTZEROTH,
CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 107-23 (1994).
See Death Penalty Information Center, Defenrlnttts lvitl~Mentnl Retnrrlntion E.recuter1 in
3.
tlte United Stntes Since the Dent11 Petlnlty Wns Reblstnted in 1976 (last modified Feb. 25, 2000)
~http://www.essential.org/dpic>;Jonathan L. Bing, Comment, Proteaing tlre Menmlfy Retnrrled
from Cnpitnl P~rnishltrenr:State Efforts Since Penry ntrrl Reconl~rrenrlntiomfor tile Artlrre, 22
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
59 (1996).
4.
Death Penalty Information Center (last modified Feb. 25,2000)
<http://www.essentiaI.org/dpic>.
According to the Death Penalty Information Center, 56 people were executed in 1995,45
5.
people were executed in 1996, 74 people were executed in 1997, 68 people were executed in
1998, and 98 people were executed in 1999. Within the tirst two months of the year 2000, 18
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Although the Supreme Court has approved the execution of mentally
retarded criminals, and several states have executed mentally retarded
inmates, this practice is plainly out of step with international convent i o n ~American
,~
Bar Association policy,7 and the positions taken by the
American Association of Mental Retardation ("AAMR)' as well as
other mental health ~ r ~ a n i z a t i o nA
s . majority
~
of Americans, including
those who favor capital punishment, oppose the execution of the mentally retarded.'' Over the past decade, Congress and a number of states
have enacted legislation specifically exempting the mentally retarded
from the death penalty. In light of these actions, the propriety of executing the mentally retarded is once again being addressed by courts" and
legal commentators1' and remains an important and compelling issue
that requires close attention. This Article will explore (1) the unique
issues surrounding the trials of mentally retarded criminal defendants
charged with capital offenses;I3 (2) Penry v. ~ ~ i z a u ~inl which
~ , ' ~ the
U.S. Supreme Court approved the execution of the mentally retarded;
(3) recent trends in this area of death penalty jurisprudence; and (4) the
future direction of the law regarding the execution of the mentally retarded.

people were executed. See id.
6.
See get~ernllyElizabeth Olson, Good Friends Join Etret~riesTo Criticize U.S. or1 H~rnmn
Riglzts. N.Y. TIMES,Mar. 28, 1999, at 1 I ; EMILYFABRYCKI
REED,THEPENRYPENALTY:CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTALRETARDATION,
39 (1 993).
7.
Coyne & Entzeroth, slrprn note 2, at 49; REED,s~rprnnote 6, at 38.
8.
Anlericnn Associntior~ on hlentnl Retnrdntion. Fnct Slreet: T11e Dent11 Pertnlty (last updated Jan. 30, 2001) <http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faqdeathpenalty.html; REED, srrprn note 6, at
37.
9.
Among the mental health organ~zationsthat oppose the execution of the mentally retarded
are: the Association for Retarded Citizens of the United States, the American Psychological Association, the Association for Persons w ~ t hSevere Handicaps, the American Association of University Affiliated Programs for the Developmentally Disabled, the National Association of Private
Residential Resources, the New York Association for Retarded Children, Inc., the National Association of Superintendents of Public Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded, the Mental
Health Law Project, and the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems. REED,
slrprn note 6, at 37-38.
10. See Denis W. Keyes & William J. Edwards, Mentnl Retnrhrion nnd the Dent11 Pennl~y:
Current Stntus of Exenlption Legislntion, 21 MENTAL& PHYSICAL
DISABILITY
L. REP. 687, 688
n. 15 (1 997); REED,s~rprnnote 6 , at 30-32.
I I . See, e.g., People v. Smithey, 978 P.2d 1171 (Cal. 1999); Lambert v. State, 984 P.2d 221
(Okla. Crim. App. 1999), cert. (letlied, 528 U.S. 1087 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Defending Cntegoricnl E.rel~tptionsto tire Dent11
Pennlty: Reflections on tlte ABA S Resolutiot~sCot~cerningthe Esec~rrionof J~n~eniles
nnd Persons
wit11 Menml Retartlation, 61 LAW& CONTEMP.PROBS.89 (1998); Keyes & Edwards, slrprn note
10; Bing, supra note 3.
13. The leading article on the mentally retarded crim~naldefendant is James W.Ellis & Ruth
nl
53 GEO. WASH. L. REV.414,422 (1985).
A. Luckasson, hlenfnlly Retnrded C r i t ~ ~ i n Defendnnts,

14.

492 U.S. 302 (1 989).
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11. THE MENTALLY
RETARDED
CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT
A. Definitions of Mental Retardation
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental ~isorders"
("DSM-IV") defines the mentally retarded individual as someone who
has "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" accompanied with "significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least
two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living,
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction,
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety."I6 To fit
within this definition, one's intellectual and adaptive deficits must manifest themselves by the time the individual is eighteen years old."
A determination that an individual has sub-average intelligence is
based on Intelligence Quotient ("IQ") scores that may be obtained
through the administration of one of several standardized intelligence
tests, including Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children--Revised,
Stanford-Binet, and Kaufman Assessment Battery for children.I8 The
mean score for intelligence is an IQ of 100. The DSM-IV rates the following IQ scores as indicative of mental retardation:
IQ 50-55 to approximately 70: mild mental retardationI9
IQ 35-40 to 50-55: moderate mental retardation
IQ 20-25 to 35-40: severe mental retardation
IQ below 20-25: profound mental retardati~n.~'
However, the DSM-IV notes that individuals with IQ scores in the range
of seventy-one to seventy-five also may be mentally retarded if they
have significant deficits in adaptive f ~ n c t i o n i n ~ . ~ '
The DSM-IV defines adaptive functioning skills-the second prong
of this definition of mental retardation-as "the presenting symptoms in
individuals with Mental ~etardation."~~
Individuals' adaptive functioning "refers to how effectively individuals cope with common life de15. A ~ ~ E R I C APSYCHIATRIC
N
ASSOCIATION,DIAGNOSTICAND STATISTICAL
MANUALOF
MENTALDISORDERS(4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Put out by the American Psychiatric
Association, this treatise is a comprehensive classification and reference manual on mental disorders, their manifestations, and treatment.
16. Id. at 39.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 40. The upper limit of IQ scores for those persons with mild mental retardation is
two standard deviations below the mean score.
20. DSM-IV, supra note 15, at 40.
21. Id. at45.
22. Id. at 40.
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mands and how well they meet the standards of personal independence
expected of someone in their particular age group, socio-cultural background, and community setting."'3 The DSM-IV notes that "[aldaptive
functioning may be influenced by various factors, including education,
motivation, personality characteristics, social and vocational opportunities, and the mental disorders and general medical conditions that may
coexist with Mental ~etardation."'~Like IQ scores, there are certain
standardized tests that measure one's adaptive functioning ski~ls.'~
Medical evaluations and school assessments are also useful in making
this determinati~n.'~In addition, "[p]roblems in adaptation are more
likely to improve with remedial efforts than is the cognitive IQ, which
tends to remain a more stable attribute.""
Persons classified as mildly retarded, formerly referred to as "educable," constitute approximately eighty-five percent of the mentally retarded population." These mildly retarded individuals have a substantial
disability. They can attain academic skills only up to a sixth grade
l e v e ~ . ' Such
~
individuals may achieve skills adequate for self-support;
however, to achieve independence in living, these individuals may require supervision, guidance, and other support.30Persons with moderate
mental retardation comprise ten percent of the mentally retarded populat i ~ n . These
~'
individuals are unlikely to attain academic skills beyond
the second grade leveL3' Moderately retarded individuals can attend to
their personal care with moderate supervision, may perform unskilled or
semi-skilled work under supervision, and may learn to travel to familiar
places independently.33 During adolescence, moderately retarded individuals may have difficulty recognizing social conventions, and this
difficulty may interfere with relationships with peers.34 Three to four
percent of the mentally retarded population are classified as severely
retarded.35The severely retarded may learn to talk during the school-age
period and may be trained in elementary self-care skills.36 The profoundly retarded, which constitute one to two percent of the mentally
retarded population, display considerable impairments and require con~~

~

Irl.

Id.
DSM-IV. srrprn note 15, at 40.
I(/.
I(/.
I(/. at 4 1.
I(/.
DSbI-IV, sliprn note 15, at 41.
I(/.
Irl.
I(/.
/(I.
DSM-IV. slrprrr nole 15, at 41.
lrl.
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stant care in a highly structured setting?'
The AAMR sets forth similar, although not identical, standards for
According to the AAMR, a person is
determining mental retardati~n.~~
deemed mentally retarded if he or she has: (1) an IQ below 70-75, (2)
concurrently existing with limitations in two or more adaptive skill areas, (3) which is manifested by age eighteen?9 In a departure from the
definitions employed by the DSM-IV, the AAMR no longer uses the
terms "mild," "moderate," "severe," and "profound" to describe an individual's mental retardati~n.~'
Instead, the AAMR has developed a "Profile and Intensities of Needed Supports," which sets out levels of support that a mentally retarded person may require?' This profile is intended to allow a more functional, service-oriented description of the
mentally retarded indi~idual.4~

B. Mental Retardation as Distinguished froin Mental Illness
It is important to recognize that mental retardation is not a form of
mental illne~s.4~
This is not to say a mentally retarded individual might
not suffer from some form of mental illness. Indeed, between twenty to
thirty-five percent of all non-institutionalized mentally retarded persons
also have been diagnosed with some form of mental illness.44However,
mental retardation is a developmental condition that is different than and
quite distinct from mental illness.
The mentally ill experience disturbances in their thoughts that may
be cyclical, episodic, or
and suffer from illnesses such as
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, psychosis, post-traumatic disorder, and
the like?6 Mental retardation is not a psychological or medical disor-

37. Id. at 41-42.
DEFINITION,
38. AMERICAN
ASS'N OF MENTALRETARDATION, MENTALRETARDATION:
AND SYSTEMS
OF SUPPORT
25 (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter AAMR DEFINITION].
CLASSIFICATION
39. Id. at 5.25.
40. Id. at 34.
41. These support levels are described as intermittent, limited, extensive, and pervasive. An
individual who requires "intermittent support" is one who requires support on an "as needed,
basis," such as during a medical crisis or the loss of a job. Such supports, although episodic in
nature, may be of high or low intensity when provided. "Limited support" is support that is
consistently required over a limited time span, such as during a transitional period involving
changing from school to work, or other similar transitions. "Extensive support" involves regular
involvement at home or work on a long-term basis. "Pervasive support" refers to constant, highintensity support across all areas of life and may include life-sustaining measures. Id. at 26.
42. Id. at 34.
43. See Denis W . Keyes et al.. Mitigating Men~nlRetnrhfion in Capital Cases: Finding The
"Invisible" Defendant, 22 MENTAL
& PHYSICAL
DISABILITY
L. REP. 529, 530 (1998); Ellis &
Luckasson. supra note 13. at 423-27.
supra note 38, at 51.
44. AAMR DEFINITION,
45. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 13, at 424.
46. Keyes et al., supra note 43, at 530.
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der;47it is a permanent developmental or functional ~ondition.~'
Often
mental illness does not emerge until after the individual is eighteen
years old.49 In contrast, by its definition, mental retardation manifests
itself by the time the mentally retarded individual is eighteen.'' Moreover, certain forms of mental illness can be treated with medication or
psychotherapy. Mental retardation cannot be ameliorated by drugs or
psychotherapy, although the mentally retarded individual may be taught
skills and strategies to better function in society and may be aided in his
functioning by various support systems and services."
Further, unlike mental illness, the risk that a person will be able to
feign mental retardation to avoid criminal prosecution or to avoid the
death penalty is greatly reduced, particularly in light of the definitions
of mental retardation employed by the DSM-IV and AAMR. As noted
above, one of the criteria for mental retardation is that the disability
manifests itself before the individual is eighteen years old.52TO substantiate mental retardation, therefore, will likely require school and health
records demonstrating the early manifestation of the disability. In most
cases, documentation establishing mental retardation, including the relevant IQ test scores, will exist before a charge of capital murder is filed.

C. The Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant
For centuries, the law has recognized that an individual's mental
retardation may affect his or her capacity to face criminal charges and be
found criminally liable. At common law, persons who were defined as
"idiots," which today would correspond with the DSM-IV's classification of severely or profoundly retarded,53 were not subject to criminal
liability.54This rule, with its corollary that "lunatics" were also excluded
from criminal liability, was the precursor to the modem insanity defense." In this context, the term "idiot" usually referred to a person with
such a limited reasoning capacity that he could not form the requisite
criminal intent or could not distinguish between good and eviLS6A few
states still use the term "idiot" and provide a corresponding exemption

srrprn note 38, at 9.
47. AAMR DEFINITION,
48. Id. at 9-10; Keyes et al., strprn note 43, at 530.
49. Keyes et al., suprn note 43, at 530.
50. AAMR DEFINITION,
suprn note 38, at 16-19; Keyes et al., srrprn note 43, at 530.
51. DSM-IV, strprn note 15, at 40 (noting that while IQ is likely to remain stable, adaptive
functioning skills are more likely to improve with remedial efforts); AAMR DEFINITION, scrprn
note 38, at 145.
52. See stcprn text accompanying note 50.
53. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,331 -33 (1989).
54. Id. at 331-32.
55. Id. at 332-33.
56. Id. at 333.
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fiom criminal liability." However, in general, modern laws subject persons with mental retardation to criminal liability.
In the early twentieth century, the mentally retarded were viewed as
threatening, dangerous, and a source of criminal conduct or immoral
behavior." The eugenics movement advocated sterilization and segregation of the mentally retarded:9 positions that met with remarkable success in the political and judicial arenas.60By the middle of the century,
however, society soundly rejected this view of the mentally retarded.6' It
is now well-accepted that mental retardation rarely, if ever, causes
criminal behavior.62
Nonetheless, mental retardation may have a significant impact on an
individual who finds himself involved with the criminal justice system,
particularly in the context of confessions and i n t e r r ~ ~ a t i o nIts .is~ ~
wellrecognized that mental retardation is not a per se bar to voluntary interrogations and confessions, although it may be a factor to be weighed in
. ~ ~ mentally retarded
evaluating the voluntariness of a c o n f e ~ s i o nMany
people may be less likely to withstand police coercion or pressure due to
their limited communication skills, their predisposition to answer questions so as to please the questioner rather than to answer the question
Further, it is not unaccurately, and their tendency to be submi~sive.~~
usual for a mentally retarded individual to have an incomplete or immature concept of blame and/or c a ~ s a t i o nThis
. ~ ~ characteristic may cause
the mentally retarded defendant to confess to an act he did not commit,
or to accept greater blame or responsibility for criminal activity than he
Accordingly, the veracity and accuracy of a conrealistically sho~ld.~'
fession by a person with mental retardation may be suspect.68
57. See, e.g., CAL.PENALCODE 3 26(2) (West 1999) (providing that "idiots" are a class of
persons not capable of committing crimes); OKLA.STAT.tit. 21, 3 152(3) (1990) (providing that
"idiots" are not capable of committing crimes). Interestingly, neither California nor Oklahoma
provide a legislative death penalty exemption for the mentally retarded capital defendant. See
in& text accompanying note 175.
58. Ellis & Luckasson, supm note 13, at 417.
59. Id. at 417-19.
60. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). In Buck, Justice Holmes upheld a Virginia eugenics statute authorizing the sterilization of the mentally disabled and infamously declared that "[tlhree generations of imbeciles are enough." Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
61. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 13, at 420.
note 158 and accompanying text.
62. Id. But see in@
63. Ellis & Luckasson, sliprn note 13, at 427-30.
64. See Connelly v. Colorado, 479 U.S. 157, 164-66 (1986) (mental deficiency alone does not
render a confession involuntary, although it may be a factor to be weighed in determining voluntariness); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433,443 (1961); Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 13, at 445-52.
65. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 13, at 428,446.
66. Id. at 445-52.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 938 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1001 (1981) (granting relief to a mentally deficient, mildly retarded man who gave police
two vastly different statements during forty-two hours of uncounseled questioning). See Coyne &
Entzeroth. supra note 2, at 25.

.
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Further, mental retardation, in and of itself, does not render an individual incompetent to stand
or incompetent to enter a guilty
plea.70However, certain characteristics that are common among people
with mental retardation, such as the tendency to be easily led, a poor
understanding of the consequences of one's actions, the desire to hide
one's mental retardation, and the desire to please authority figures, can
affect the quality and ability of a mentally retarded person to make decisions that are in his best interest." Thus, the ability of the mentally retarded defendant to assist counsel in preparing a case and in making
critical decisions about the course of a capital murder trial may be compromised.

111. THESUPREME
COURT'SDECISION
ALLOWING
THE IMPOSITION OF
THE DEATHPENALTY
ON THE MENTALLY
RETARDED
A. Background

The Supreme Court first explicitly sanctioned the execution of the
mentally retarded in Penry v. ~ ~ n a ua ~plurality
h , ~ opinion
~
authored by
Justice O'Connor. At the time of his crime, Johnny Paul Penry, a mentally retarded, African-American man, was twenty-two years old.

69. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (to be competent to stand trial, defendant must have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding" and must have "a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him").
70. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397-99 (1993) (standard for determining competence to plead guilty is same as standard for determining competence to stand trial); Parke v.
Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1992) (guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969) (record must show that defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to trial).
Associntion on Merttnl Retnrdntion. Fnct Slleer: T l ~ eDentlz Pennlty (last modi71. At~~ericnrl
fied June 21, 2000) <http//www.aamr.orglPolicieslfaqdeathpenalty.html.Moreover, once incarcerated, the mentally retarded prisoner faces increased risks and difficulties. For example, the
mentally retarded inmate is more likely to be abused, victimized, exploited, and injured than other
prisoners. Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 13, at 479-80. The mentally retarded inmate is also more
likely to have disciplinary problems. Id. at 480-81. As a result, the mental retarded prisoner will
often serve a longer prison term. Id. Unfortunately, there are only limited support systems available in prison to assist the mentally retarded. Id.
72. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). On the other hand, the Court has ruled that a person who is insane at
the time o f his execution may not be executed. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,409-10 (1986).
Nonetheless, on January 24, 1992, Rickey Ray Rector, a man with obvious and profound mental
defects, was killed by lethal injection in Arkansas. Coyne & Entzeroth, slrprn note 2, at 43-44.
Rector shot and killed a police officer, then shot himself in the forehead; he underwent brain
surgery that required removal of three inches o f frontal brain tissue. Id. There was no question
that Rector's mental abilities were significantly impaired. Id. In the days leading up to his execution, Rector's behavior included such bizarre acts as barking like a dog, stamping his feet, snapping his fingers, repeatedly calling out the nickname of an old friend, and laughing. Id. When his
last meal was served, Rector devoured his dinner, but saved his dessert to be eaten later-after his
execution. Id.
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Penry's IQ fell between fifty and sixty-three, 73 which placed him in the
mild to moderate range of the DSM-IV classification of mental retardat i ~ nA. ~
clinical
~
psychologist who examined Penry indicated that Penry
had the mental age of a six-and-a-half year old and the social maturity of
a nine- to ten-year-old.75 As pointed out earlier, mildly retarded individuals may learn skills up to the sixth grade level, and persons with
moderate mental retardation are unlikely to achieve academic skills beyond the second grade
In addition to his mental retardation, Penry grew up in a home where
horrible abuse was regularly inflicted upon him.77Shortly after his birth,
Penry's mother suffered a nervous breakdown and was committed to a
mental hospital for ten months.78When she returned to her young son,
she subjected him to severe beatings, including blows to his head and
cigarette bums on his body. 79 Penry dropped out of school in the first
grade and was in and out of state institutions until he was twelve years
old, after which he went to live with an aunt. It took his aunt a year to
teach Penry the simple task of printing his name.8'
After being paroled for a rape conviction, Penry moved to
Livingston, exa as.'^ On October 25, 1979, Penry entered the home of
Pamela Mosely Carpenter, a twenty-two year old white woman and sister of Mark Mosley, a professional football player.83Penry attacked and
raped Carpenter, who struggled and used a pair of scissors to fend off
~ e n rEnraged,
~ . ~ ~Penry stabbed Carpenter with her scissors.85Carpenter
died a few hours later during emergency treatment; however, she was
able to identify Penry as her attacker before her death.86Penry subsequently gave two confessions to the crime.87He was charged with capital murder.
73. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307-08
74. See supra text accompanying notes 15-21 on DSM-IV classification and skill levels.
75. Penry, 492 U.S. at 308.
76. DSM-IV, supra note 15, at 41.
77. Penry, 492 U.S. at 308-09; REED,supra note 6 , at I.
78. REED,supra note 6, at 1.
79. Penry, 492 U.S. at 308-09; REED,supra note 6, at 1-2.
80. Penry, 492 U.S. at 309; REED, sicpra note 6 , at 2.
81. Penry, 492 U.S. at 309; REED, supra note 6 , at 2.
82. Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636,653 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
83. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307; Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 917 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in
port and rev'd in par!, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); REED, supra note 6, at 2. As noted
above, Penry was African-American, and Carpenter was Caucasian. Numerous studies have shown
that the race of the victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant play a key role in determining which criminal defendants ultimately will be sentenced to death. See McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 2, at 35-40.
84. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307; REED, supra note 6 , at 2.
85. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307; REED, supra note 6, at 2.
86. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68 on confessions by the mentally retarded.
88. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.
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A competency hearing was held before Penry's murder
Evidence was presented at the hearing showing that previous testing indi~ Otesting immedicated Penry's IQ fell between fifty and s i ~ t ~ - t h r e e .IQ
ately preceding the competency trial revealed an IQ of fifty-four.9' The
psychologist who tested Penry testified that, "'there's a point at which
anyone with [Penry's] IQ is always incompetent, but, you know, this
man is more in the borderline range.'"92 The jury found him competent
to stand
During the guiltlinnocence phase of Penry's capital murder trial,
Penry's two confessions were found to be voluntary and were admitted
into evidence.94 Penry raised an insanity defense, presenting evidence
that his mental retardation and brain damage resulted in poor impulse
control, an inability to learn from his experiences, an inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts, and an inability to conform his conduct to the law.95 In rebuttal, the State presented evidence that Penry
was sane at the time of his crime although the State conceded that Penry
had an extremely limited mental ability and seemed unable to learn from
his mistakes." The jury rejected Penry's insanity defense and found him
guilty of capital murder.97
The case then proceeded to the capital sentencing phase of trial. Under the Texas death penalty statutory scheme, the jury was required to
answer three questions or "special issues" to determine Penry's fate.
Under Section 19.03 of the Texas Penal Code, the jury had to determine
whether the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of
the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would
result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
89. Under Texas law, a hearing to determine whether a defendant is competent to stand trial
is held prior to trial. See TEX. CODECRIM.P. ANN.art. 46.02 (West 2001). Under Article 46.02,
"A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have: (I) sufficient present ability to
consult with the person's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person." See Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Article 46.02 further provides, a "defendant is presumed
competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by
a preponderance of the evidence."
90. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307-08.
91. Id. at 308.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.; Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636, 643-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
95. Pettry, 492 U.S. at 308-09.
96. Id. at 309.
97. Id. at 3 10.
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threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the
provocation, if any, by the de~eased.9~
If the jury answered "yes" to all three questions, the penalty of death
would be imposed?9 The jury answered "yes" to all three questions, and
accordingly, the trial court sentenced Penry to death.'''
Penry appealed his conviction and death sentence to the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed.'0' Penry then petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari, which the Court denied.'''
Penry next sought federal habeas relief. After the federal district court
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied habeas relief,'03 Penry
again filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. This time,
the Supreme Court granted ~ e r t i o r a r i 'to
~ ~answer two questions: (1)
whether the sentencing instructions adequately advised the jury that they
were to consider all of Mr. Penry's mitigating evidence, in particular
evidence of his mental retardation, in determining whether he should be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment; and (2) whether the execution
of a mentally retarded person constitutes a per se violation of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth ~mendment."~
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackrnun joined Justice
OYConnorin answering the first question. These five justices concluded
that during the sentencing phase of trial, the jury had not been adequately advised that they were to consider Penry's mental retardation
and abused childhood as evidence mitigating against the imposition of
the death penalty.'06 The Court accordingly ordered the case remanded
for resentencing.'07 Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy dis-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

98. Id.
99. For a discussion on the Texas capital sentencing scheme and the constitutionality of the
three special issues, see Jurek v. Texns, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
100. Penry, 492 U.S. at 3 11.
101. Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
102. Penry v. Texas, 474 U.S. 1073 (1986).
103. Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1987). For an interesting discussion on Jurek
and the potential concerns raised by Texas' unique death penalty system, see the concurring opinion of Judge Ganvood. Penry, 832 F.2d at 926-32.
104. Penry v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988).
105. Penry, 492 U.S. at 3 13.
106. Id. at 313-28. Although an in-depth discussion of this aspect of the Penry decision is beyond the scope of this Article, several scholars have analyzed the Court's finding that Texas failed
to provide Penry with a meaningful mechanism by which to present and have the jury fully consider his mental retardation as evidence mitigating against the imposition of the death penalty. For
further discussion of this aspect of the opinion, see e.g., Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Wllnt Hnth Penry
Wrougl~f?
Mitigating Circumsfnnces nnd the Terns Denfli PennIfy, 19 AM.J . CRIM.L. 345 (1992);
Note. A Rensoned Morn1 Response: Rethinking Texns S Cnpitnl Sentencing Statute Afier Penry v.
Lynaugh, 69 TEX.L. REV. 407 (1990).
107. Penry. 492 U.S. at 340.
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agreed, finding that the sentencing instructions did not run afoul of the
Constitution and that resentencing was not warranted.Io8
As to the second question, the configuration of the Court was reversed. This time, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy
joined Justice 07Connorto reject the argument that the imposition of the
death penalty on the mentally retarded violated the Cruel and Unusual
~
Brennan, MarPunishment Clause of the Eighth ~ m e n d m e n t . "Justices
shall, Stevens, and Blackmun dissented on this issue."0 Pivotal to the
justices' reasoning is the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment.

B. The Eighth Amendinent S Prohibition on Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
Although the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of "cruel
and unusual punishment," the Constitution does not define or provide
further guidance on the meaning of those words. The "cruel and unusual
punishment" prohibition first appeared in the English Bill of Rights of
1689, which was drafted by the British Parliament at the accession of
William and ~ a r ~ . Apparently,
"'
the prohibition was aimed at punishments that were not authorized by law, or punishments that were disproportionate to the crime.Il2 The framers of the United States Constitution
drew on that language and incorporated the "cruel and unusual punishment" proscription into the Eighth Amendment of the Bill of ~ i ~ h t s . " ~
It appears that the drafters intended the provision to prohibit, at a minimum, the forms of punishment banned at the time the Constitution was
drafted1I4and intended it to proscribe torture and other barbarous forms
of punishment.1l 5
During the twentieth century, the Supreme Court began to flesh out
the contours of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. In so doing,
the Court construed the Eighth Amendment to go beyond merely prohibiting those forms of punishment that were outlawed in colonial times.
Indeed, the Court found that society's evolving standards of decency
also should inform and instruct the Court on the parameters of the
Eighth ~ m e n d m e n t . " ~
108. Id. at 353-60.
109. Id. at 328-40, 350-51.
110. Id. at341-50.
1 1 1. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (citing Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel nnd
Un~cs~cnl
Punishment It~Jicted: The Originnl Menning, 57 CAL. L. REV.839, 852-53 (1969)).
112. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169.
1 13. Id. at 169-70.
114. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,330 (1989).
1 15. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170.
116. For a discussion on the modem interpretation o f the Eighth Amendment, see Earl Martin.
"
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This construction of the Eighth Amendment first appeared in 1910
in Wee~nsv. United ~tates."' In Weems, the defendant challenged, inter
alia, his sentence of fifteen years in chains at hard and painful labor that
the Court of First Instance for the City of Manila imposed on him for the
crime of false entry on a public document by a public 0fficia1.I'~Although the Supreme Court of the Philippines affirmed the defendant's
conviction and sentence, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that the punishment violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
and reversed the defendant's conviction and sentence with instructions
to dismiss the
The crime for which Weems was convicted harmed no one and did not benefit weems.120The Court observed
that Weems' punishment for this crime would "amaze those who have
formed their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending
citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths, and believe
that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense."I2' In viewing Weems' punishment in
the context of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Court declined to limit the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to those
forms of punishment outlawed at the time the Constitution was
drafted.Iu Rather, the Court found that
a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of
constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to
meet passing occasions . . . . In the application of a constitution,
therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been
but of what may be.'23
The Court observed that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
"may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice. 9,124
The Court expanded on Weerns in Trop v. ~ u l l e s . ' *In~ 1944, Trop
was serving as a private in the United States Army when he deserted for

Tobvnrds nn Evolving Debnre on the Decency ojcnpilnl Pttnisltn~ent,66 GEO.WASH.
L. REV.84,
88-93 (1997).
117.- 217.u.s. 349 (1910).
118. Weens, 217 U.S. at 357-58.
119. I d a t 3 8 2 .
120. Id. at 365.
121. Id. at 366-67.
122. Id. at 372-73.
123. Weens, 217 U.S. at 373.
124. Id. at 378.
125. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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one day.'26 Trop was court-martialed for desertion, convicted, and sentenced to three years at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay, and a dishonorable discharge.I2' Moreover, as a result of his court-martial and conviction, Trop, a native-born American, was stripped of his U.S. citizenship.I2' Trop asked the Court to consider whether the loss of his American citizenship was a cruel and unusual punishment for his crime.'29
Writing for a majority of the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated
that the question before the Court was "whether this penalty [of denationalization] subjects the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle
of civilized treatment guaranteed by the Eighth ~ r n e n d m e n t . " 'While
~~
acknowledging that the exact scope of the Eighth Amendment had not
been clearly established, the Court nonetheless stated that "[tlhe basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment
stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards."13' The Court then concluded, in language that continues to characterize our understanding of the Eighth Amendment, that
"[tlhe Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."'32 Relying on
this standard, the Court concluded that stripping Trop of his U.S. citizenship violated the Eighth ~ m e n d m e n t . The
' ~ ~ Court observed that the
international community was in virtual agreement that stripping a citizen
of his citizenship should not be imposed as a form of punishment for the
crime of d e ~ e r t i 0 n .This
l ~ ~ fact, although not determinative, was found to
support the Court's application of the Eighth Amendment in ~ r o ~ . ' ~ '
A few years later in Robinson v. ~ a l i f o r n i a , the
' ~ ~Court found that a
sentence of ninety days in county jail for the crime of being addicted to
narcotics constituted a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth ~ m e n d m e n t . ' ~The
' Court reasoned that one who is addicted to
narcotics suffers from an illness and imprisonment on the basis of such a
disability constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment.'38 The Court
noted, "To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract,
a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot
Trop, 356 U.S. at 87.
Id. at 87-88.
Id.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 99.
Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id. at 102-03.
Id.
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
Id. at 667.
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be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel
and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold.,9139
In 1976, the Supreme Court examined the Eighth Amendment in the
' ~ ' pivotal case in
context of the death penalty. In Gregg v. ~ e o r ~ i a ,the
which the modern death penalty jurisprudence has its genesis, a plurality
of the Court followed the reasoning of Weems and Trop and found that
the Eighth Amendment is to be interpreted in a flexible and dynamic
manner that reflects society's evolving standards of decency.I4' The
Court stated that in reviewing the constitutionality of a death sentence
under the Eighth Amendment, the Court must assess "contemporary values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction . . . . [Tlhis assessment does not call for a subjective judgment. It requires, rather, that
we look to objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a
given sanction.,9142 However, the Court found that public opinion is not
the only or the determinative factor to be considered in deciding whether
a sentence constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment.'43 The Court
found that the punishment must also be in "accord with 'the dignity of
man,' which is the 'basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.
4
This means, at least, that the punishment not be 'excessive. ~ 9 ~ 1 4~h~
Court defined "excessive" as consisting of two elements. First, "the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain[,]"145which means that the death penalty as imposed must advance
Second, "the punthe penological goals of retribution and deterren~e.'~~
ishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime."14'
C. The Court's Decision in Penry
Against this backdrop, Justice O'Connor considered the imposition
' ~ ' with the Court's
of the death penalty in Penly v. ~ ~ n a u ~ hIn. accord
modem Eighth Amendment cases, Justice O'Connor found that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause must be viewed in light of "'the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing so139. ld.
140. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
141. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171.
142. Id. at 173.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citation omitted).
145. Id.
146. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
147. Id. On occasion, the Court has found a punishment disproportionate to the crime. See,
e.g., United States v . Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339-40 (1998) (holding fine imposed disproportionate to crime); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (finding death penalty disproportionate punishment for the crime of rape of an adult woman).
148. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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~ i e t y . " " In
~ ~making this evaluation, Justice O'Connor applied a twoprong test: (1) whether "objective evidence" demonstrates a national
consensus that the execution of the mentally retarded should be barred;
and (2) whether the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded makes a measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment and was it proportionate to the crime.IS0
In addressing the first prong, Justice O'Connor opined that the most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values was found in the
statutes enacted by the country's legislatures. IS' She also considered the
actions of sentencing juries in imposing certain punishments on particular classes of defendants."' In 1989, at the time the Court decided
Penry, only Georgia and the federal government exempted the mentally
retarded from the death penalty.'53 Maryland had enacted legislation
barring the execution of the mentally retarded, but the legislation went
into effect a week after the Court handed down ~ e n r ~ . Justice
''~
O'Connor stated that even when the Georgia and Maryland statutory
protections for the mentally retarded were "added to the 14 States that
have rejected capital punishment completely, [such legislative actions
did] not provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus"
to exclude the mentally retarded from the punishment of death."'
Having found that the actions of the state legislatures did not sufficiently demonstrate a "national consensus" exempting the mentally retarded from the death penalty, Justice O'Connor then considered other
evidence that might shed light on how the nation viewed the execution
of the mentally retarded. Although Penry had not presented the Court
with evidence regarding the behavior of sentencing juries towards mentally retarded capital defendants, he did offer several public opinion
polls indicating that a majority of Americans disfavored the execution of
the mentally retarded and presented evidence that the AAMR and other
organizations opposed the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded.lS6Justice O'Connor was not persuaded. She stated:
The public sentiment expressed in these and other polls and
resolutions may ultimately find expression in legislation, which
149. Penry, 492 U.S. at 330-31 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
150. Id. at 328-40.
151. Id. at 331.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 334.
154. Penty, 492 U.S. at 334. Pen,y was handed down on June 26, 1989; the Maryland statute
went into effect on July 1. 1989.
155. Id. For a criticism of the Court's heavy reliance on state legislation in determining the
scope and meaning of the Eighth Amendment, see Matthew E. Albers, Note, Legislnlive Deference in Eiglrrlr Anretlhnet~rCnpirnl Senrencing Cl~nllenges:The Constitutionnl Inndequncy of rite
Crcrrenr Jr~dicicrlAppronclr, 50 C A S EW . RES. L. REV.467 (1 999).
156. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-35.
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is an objective indicator of contemporary values upon which we
can rely. But at present, there is insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded people
convicted of capital offenses for us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth ~mendment."'
Having reached this determination, Justice O'Connor turned to the
second prong of her analysis. She stated that it was clear that mental
retardation was long regarded as a factor that mitigated against the imposition of the death penalty and that all states allowed a defendant to
submit evidence of his mental retardation as mitigating e~idence."~
Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor concluded that "[oln the record before
the Court today, however, I cannot conclude that all mentally retarded
people of Penry's ability-by virtue of their mental retardation alone,
and apart from any individualized consideration of their personal responsibility-inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty.'7159 Therefore, and without much further elaboration, Justice
O'Connor found that the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally
retarded made a measurable contribution to the penological goals of
deterrence and retribution and that it was not disproportionate to the
crime.
Justice Scalia concurred with Justice O7Connor's ultimate result on
this question. However, his analysis of the issue was much simpler.160
He found that in determining whether a punishment comports with the
Eighth Amendment, he would look only at how the state legislatures and
the sentencing juries treat the issue.I6' Justice Scalia opined that unless
157. Id. at 335.
158. Id. at 337. However, it has also been observed that an individual's mental retardation may
serve as a double-edged sword. See Allen v. Massie, No. 98-6340,2000 WL 16321 (10th Cir. Jan.
11,2000) (unpublished decision); Michael L. Perlin, Symposium on Cnpitnl Punishn~entthe Snnist
Lives of Jurors in Denth Pennlty Cnses: The Puzzling Role Of "Mitignting" Mentnl Disnbility
Evidence, 8 NOTREDAMEJ.L. ETHICS& PuB.'PoL'Y 239 (1994); Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A
Continuing Source Of Aggravation: The Inlproper Consideration of Mitignting Fnctors in Dentlr
Pennlty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 409 (1990). For example, a local South Carolina newspaper
provided the following analysis of a mentally retarded criminal defendant:
Down in Conway, a circuit judge has handed down a no-nonsense decision upholding law and order. . . . The case involves convicted killer Limmie Arthur, 28, who
has the social intelligence of a 10- to 12-year-old and the mental ability of a 7-yearold. This was enough sense to enable him to kill William "Cripple Jack" Miller in
1984. . . It appears to us that there is all the more reason to execute a killer if he is
also insane or retarded. Killers often kill again; an insane or retarded killer is more
to be feared than a sane or normal killer. There is also far less possibility of his
ever becoming a useful citizen.
Upholding Ln~vnnd Order, HARTSVILLE
MESSENGER,
June 24, 1987, at SB, col. I.; Coyne &
Entzeroth, slrprn note 2, at 41 n.383
159. Pcnry. 492 U.S. at 338.
160. Id. at 350-60.
161. Id.

.
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an objective examination of the laws and jury determinations demonstrated that the country had "set its face against" a form of punishment,
such punishment was not proscribed by the Eighth ~ m e n d m e n t . ' ~ '
Without discussing Weems, Trop, or Gregg, Justice Scalia found it unnecessary for the Court to take the next step and determine whether the
punishment made a measurable contribution to the goals of punishment
and whether it was proportionate to the crime.'63
Given that only three death penalty jurisdictions exempted the mentally retarded from the death penalty, it is not surprising that in his dissent Justice Brennan sidestepped the "national consensus" issue and
focused on (1) whether executing the mentally retarded advanced the
goals of deterrence and retribution, and (2) whether the death penalty
was disproportionate when imposed on the mentally retarded.'64 Justice
Brennan stated that in determining whether a punishment advances legitimate penological goals, one must look not only to the type or form of
punishment to be imposed, but also one must consider the blameworthiness of the individual or class of individuals on whom the punishment is
to be i n f l i ~ t e d . 'Justice
~~
Brennan recognized that although there may be
differences among the mentally retarded in their ability to live independently or semi-independently, the clinical definition of mental retardation necessarily narrows this class of individuals to persons who have
significant intellectual and adaptive skills deficit^.'^^ For this reason,
Justice Brennan concluded that the mentally retarded lacked sufficient
moral culpability to advance the goal of retribution, which requires that
a criminal sentence be directly related to the defendant's personal culpability.I6' Further, he reasoned that the goal of deterrence would not be
advanced, as "[ilt is highly unlikely that the exclusion of the mentally
retarded from the class of those eligible to be sentenced to death will
lessen any deterrent effect the death penalty may have for nonretarded
potential offenders. . . .3,168 Moreover, because of the impairments in the
ability of a mentally retarded person to understand the consequences of
his actions and to control his impulses, it is unlikely that the execution
of the mentally retarded would deter other mentally retarded criminal
defendants from committing capital 0 f f e n ~ e s . I ~ ~
As to the proportionality of the punishment, Justice Brennan stated
that "[tlhe impairment 0f.a mentally retarded offender's reasoning abili162. lrl.at351.
163. Id. Justice Scalia elaborated on his views on Eighth Amendment analysis in Stnnford v.
Ketzrucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), which was decided the same day as Penry.
164. Penr)., 492 U.S. at 343-49.
165. Id. at 343.
166. Id. at 344-45.
167. Id. at 348.
168. Id.
169. Slnnforc/, 492 U.S. at 348-49.
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ties, control over impulsive behavior, and moral development in my
view limits his or her culpability so that, whatever other punishment
might be appropriate, the ultimate penalty of death is always and necessarily disproportionate to his or her blameworthiness and is therefore
unconstitutional.'y~70
He further found that even if Justice OYConnor's
assertion that there were some mentally retarded defendants who were
sufficiently "blameworthy" so as to be subject to the death penalty, the
capital sentencing process provided an inadequate mechanism by which
to distinguish among those mentally retarded persons who should be
subject to the death penalty and those who should not.17' Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded that the imposition of the death penalty on the
mentally retarded was nothing more than a purposeless and needless
infliction of pain and suffering that violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment ~ 1 a u s e . I ~ ~
While Justice Brennan's view did not persuade a majority of his
brethren in 1989, the majority's decision is not necessarily the final
word on this question. Indeed, in concluding her analysis allowing the
execution of mentally retarded defendants, Justice O'Connor noted that
"a national consensus against execution of the mentally retarded may
someday emerge reflecting the 'evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.""73 However, she did not believe
that in June of 1989 that day had yet arrived.174The question now is
whether a national consensus has been reached indicating that indeed
society no longer approves of or wishes to sanction the execution of the
mentally retarded.

D. Current Legislation
In the eleven years that have passed since Penry, the national landscape on this issue has changed dramatically. In 1989, only Georgia,
Maryland, and the federal government exempted the mentally retarded
fiom the penalty of death. Now, ten more states ban the execution of the
mentally retarded-Arkansas,
Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Tennessee, and washington.I7' In170. Id. at 346.
171. Id. at 346-47.
172. Id. at 349.
173. Id. at 340.
174. Sfnnford, 492 U.S. at 340.
175. ARK.CODEANN. 5 5-4-618(b) (Michie 1993) ("No defendant with mental retardation at
the time of committing capital murder shall be sentenced to death."); COLO. REV. STAT. 5 16-9403 (Supp. 1994) ("A sentence of death shall not be imposed upon any defendant who is determined to be a mentally retarded defendant pursuant to section 16-9-402. If any person who is
determined to be a mentally retarded defendant is found guilty of a class 1 felony, such defendant
shall be sentenced to life imprisonment."); GA. CODEANN. 17-7-1316) (1990 & Supp. 1994)
("In the trial of any case in which the death penalty is sought which commences on or after July 1,

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 52:3:911

terestingly, Kansas and New York only recently re-instated the death
penalty, and in so doing each state expressly excluded the mentally retarded. Connecticut, while not explicitly excluding the mentally retarded
from the penalty of death, provides that the death penalty shall not be
imposed on an individual whose "mental capacity was significantly impaired or his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was significantly impaired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution. ,9176
In states that ban the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally
retarded, the state usually requires the mentally retarded defendant to
put forth evidence of his mental retardation. For example, section
532.140 of the Kentucky Penal Code prohibits the execution of "a seriously mentally retarded offender." This statute went into effect on July
13, 1990, a little more than a year after the Court handed down Penry.
To seek an exemption from the death penalty under this statutory provision, defense counsel must file a motion with the trial court within thirty
days of trial stating that the defendant is seriously mentally retarded and
present evidence of the mental r e t a r d a t i ~ n .The
' ~ ~ Commonwealth may
1988, should the judge find in accepting a plea of guilty but mentally retarded or the jury or court
find in its verdict that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged but mentally retarded, the death
penalty shall not be imposed and the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for
life."); IND. CODE Q: 35-36-9-6 (1994) ("If the court determines that the defendant is a mentally
retarded individual under section 5 o f this chapter, the part o f the state's charging instrument filed
under IC 35-50-2-9(a) that seeks a death sentence against the defendant shall be dismissed.");
KAN. STAT. ANN. jj 21-4623(d) (Supp. 1994) ("If, at the conclusion of a hearing pursuant to this
section, the court determines that the defendant is mentally retarded, the court shall sentence the
defendant as otherwise provided by law, and no sentence of death shall be imposed hereunder.");
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. jj 532.140(1) (Michie 1990) ("no offender who has been determined to be a
seriously mentally retarded offender under the provisions o f KRS 532.135, shall be subject to
execution"); MD. CODEANN., Crimes and Punishments, jj 412(g)(l) (1992) ("If a person found
guilty o f murder in the first degree was, at the time the murder was committed, less than 18 years
old o r if the person establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the person was, at the time
the murder was committed, mentally retarded, the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for
life or imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole and may not be sentenced to
death."); NEB. REV. STAT. jj 28-105.01(2) (1997) ("Notwithstanding any other provision o f law,
the death penalty shall not be imposed upon any person with mental retardation."); N.M. STAT.
ANN. jj 31-20A-2.1(B) (Michie 1994) ("The penalty of death shall not be imposed on any person
who is mentally retarded."); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW jj 400.27(12)(c) (McKinney 1995) ("In the
event the defendant is sentenced pursuant to this section to death, the court shall thereupon render
a finding with respect to whether the defendant is mentally retarded. If the court finds the defendant is mentally retarded, the court shall set aside the sentence of death and sentence the defendant either to life imprisonment without parole o r to a term o f imprisonment for the class A-I
felony o f murder in the first degree other than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.");
TENN.CODEANN. jj 39-13-203(b) (1991 & Supp. 1994) ("Notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary, no defendant with mental retardation at the time of committing first degree murder
shall be sentenced to death."); WASH. REV. CODE g 10.95.030(2) (1993) ("In no case, however,
shall a person be sentenced to death if the person was mentally retarded at the time the crime was
committed").
176. CONN.GEN.STAT. jj 53a-46a(h)(2) (1994).
177. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. jj 532.135 (Michie 1999). See id. jjjj 202B.010(9), 210.005. These
provisions regulate health and social services for the mentally retarded and provide the same
definition for mental retardation.
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present evidence in rebuttal. The trial court will make a determination
ten days before trial as to whether the defendant is seriously mentally
retarded and whether he should be subject to the death penalty.
The definition of "seriously mentally retarded," as used by the Kentucky Legislature, is in accord with the DSM-IV. Section 532.130 of the
Kentucky Penal Code defines a "seriously mentally retarded" criminal
defendant as one "with significant subaverage intellectual functioning
existing concurrently with substantial deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the developmental period.,3178 Consistent with the
DSM-IV, "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" is
defined as an IQ below seventy.17' Thus, had Penry committed his crime
in Kentucky, he would not have been eligible for the death penalty.
If the trial court concludes that a criminal defendant is exempt from
the death penalty due to his mental retardation, he remains subject to the
other penalties that may be imposed on a person who is convicted of a
capital offense.'80 These penalties are quite severe and include: (1) life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, (2) life imprisonment
without the benefit of probation or parole until the defendant has served
a minimum of twenty-five years, (3) life imprisonment, or (4) a term of
imprisonment of not less than twenty years or more than fifty years.18'
Even if the trial court concludes that a defendant is not mentally retarded, a defendant's mental condition and his limited mental abilities
may be considered factors that mitigate against the imposition of the
death penalty in accordance with penry.lg2
Nebraska employs a similar statutory scheme to determine whether a
criminal defendant should be excluded from the death penalty based on
his mental retardation. In exempting the mentally retarded from the
death penalty, Nebraska also uses the DSM-IV definition. Section 28105.01 of Nebraska Revised Statutes defines mental retardation as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior. An intelligence quotient of
seventy or below on a reliably administered intelligence quotient test
shall be presumptive evidence of mental retardation." If a court finds by
a preponderance of the evidence that a criminal defendant is mentally
retarded, he may not be sentenced to death, but may be sentenced to life
imprisonment for capital murder.lR3Thus, it is unlikely Penry would
178. Id. Q 532.130. This provision does not define "developmental period." As noted earlier,
the DSM-IV refers to 18 as the age by which mental retardation must be manifested.
179. Id.
180. Id. $8 507.020,532.030(1).
181. KY. REV. STAT.ANN. Q 532.030(1). For a discussion on the mentally retarded inmate see
suprn note 71 and accompanying text.
182. See Hunter v. Commonwealth, 869 S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1994); Smith v. Commonwealth, 845
S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1993).
183. NEB. REV. STAT.Q 28.105.01(3) (Supp. 2000).
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have been sentenced to death in Nebraska.
Over the past eleven years, legislation to ban the execution of the
mentally retarded has surfaced in other states.Is4 In the first two months
of the year 2000, legislators in seven states introduced bills to ban the
execution of the mentally retarded. In January 2000, Arizona state legislators introduced legislation in both the Arizona house and senate to
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on any individual who was
found to be mentally retarded.'" On February 1, 2000, six Alabama state
senators introduced several bills that, inter alia, would exempt the mentally retarded from the death penalty.'86 Similarly, Mississippi, Missouri,
Oklahoma, and South Dakota legislators introduced legislation seeking
to exempt the mentally retarded from the state's death penalty.'87 In late
January 2000, Illinois Senate Bill 1488 and Illinois House Bill 4017
were introduced seeking to amend the Illinois Criminal Code by prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally retarded."' On
January 3 1, 2000, the Governor of Illinois imposed a moratorium on the
death penalty in that state until certain grave concerns about the system
were addressed.lS9 Given these legislative changes, one must wonder
whether or not Justice O'Connor's forewarning that this issue someday
might require reconsideration has now come to pass.
IV. THEFUTURE
DIRECTION
OF A NATIONAL
AND/OR CONSTITUTIONAL
OF THE MENTALLY
RETARDED
BANON THE EXECUTION
Several state appellate judges recently concluded that the execution
of the mentally retarded violates the standards of decency that mark a
maturing society and have found that Penry is no longer valid, particularly in light of the national trend towards exempting the mentally retarded from capital punishment. In his dissenting opinion in Lambert v.
~ t a t e , ' ~Judge
'
Charles Chapel of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals'9' concluded that the execution of the mentally retarded violated
the "cruel or unusual punishment" clause of the Oklahoma Constitution.
Judge Chapel described Lambert, the mentally retarded criminal defendant who was seeking relief from his death sentence, as follows:
184. Bing, sriprn note 3, at 1 14-38.
185. Ariz. S.B. 1455, Ariz. H.B. 2532 (Ariz. 44th Leg. - 2d Reg. Sess. 2000).
186. Ala. S.B. 7, 60 (Ala. Reg. Sess. 2000).
187. Miss. Bill No. 2389 (Reg. Sess. of Miss. Leg. 2000); Mo. H.B. 1225 (Mo. 2d Reg. Sess.
of the 90th Gen. Assembly 2000); Okla. H.B. 2713 (2000); South Dakota H.B. 1196 (S. D. 75th
Leg. Assembly 2000)
188. 111. H.B. 4017, 111. S.B. 1488 (111. 91st Gen. Assembly -- 1999-2000 Reg. Sess.).
189. Richard Wolf, I l l i ~ ~ o iWill
s Delny Dent11 Sentences; Executions Fnce O ~ h e rChnNenges,
USA TODAY,Jan. 3 1,2000, at 4A.
190. 984 P.2d 22 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999).
191. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals is the highest state court in Oklahoma to hear
criminal cases.
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Although he is a grown man, Lambert cannot make change. He
spells no better than a seven year old and reads at a third grade
level. When Lambert was seventeen years old, the Oklahoma
Juvenile Services Division tested him. The State's testing revealed that Lambert has an IQ of 68 and that he is mentally retarded. Prior to this testing, Lambert struggled through special
education classes. Lambert barely managed to get through kindergarten. Finally he dropped out of school when he was in the
seventh grade. Lambert was never able to function successfully
in a school setting, and after he dropped out of school, his mental retardation limited his ability to work or survive in the outside world. Lambert's entire life has been shaped by his mental
retardation. Although he is now thirty years old, he has the mental age of an eight year old. His thinking and reasoning are
equivalent to that of a child in the second or third grade. His
moral culpability is, of necessity, on the same leve1.Ig2
Judge Chapel focused his discussion on Article 11, Section 9 of the
Oklahoma Constitution, which bars the imposition of "cruel or unusual
punishment" and provides arguably broader protection to Oklahoma
defendants than the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishment" proscription.193Judge Chapel concluded:
It is our duty to interpret and enforce the Oklahoma Constitution. Given Oklahoma's traditional protection of the mentally retarded, the growing national ban on the execution of the mentally retarded, and the lack of penological goals advanced by the
execution of these individuals, I believe the execution of the .
mentally retarded is a cruel or unusual punishment prohibited
under Oklahoma law. I therefore respectfully dissent to the execution of a mental1 retarded man who has the mental age of an
eight-year-old boy.x 4
This issue also arose before the California Supreme Court. In People
v. nithe he^,'^^ Justice Mosk concluded in a concurring opinion that Penry
is no longer valid under the Eighth Amendment in light of the legislative
changes that have taken place since 1989. Justice Mosk stated:
I would hold that the cruel and unusual punishments clause [of
the United States Constitution] now prohibits execution of a sen-

-

-

-

-

192. Lonlberf, 984 P.2d at 240.
193. Dodd v. State, 879 P.2d 822, 828-30 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (Chapel. J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
194. Lomberf,984 P.2d at 244 (footnote omitted).
195, 978 P.2d 1171 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J., concurring).
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tence of death against mentally retarded persons. I am able to
discern that, since Penry, "evolving standards of decency" have
indeed evolved sufficiently in this area. Indeed, I cannot do otherwise. For I find that the requisite "national consensus" has, in
fact, ernerged.lg6
In a footnote, Justice Mosk also stated that Article I, Section 17 of the
California Constitution precluded the imposition of the death penalty on
the mentally retarded.I9' Like the Oklahoma Constitution, the California
Constitution prohibits the imposition of cruel or unusual punishment
and provides greater protection to defendants in California than does the
Eighth Amendment.
Although he concluded that the mentally retarded could not be executed under either the California or U.S. Constitution, Justice Mosk determined that the defendant before the court was not mentally retarded
and therefore was not exempt from the death penalty. The majority
agreed with Justice Mosk that the defendant was not mentally retarded.
A majority of the court, however, was unwilling to declare that the execution of the mentally retarded was unconstitutional. The majority simply stated, "[W]e determine that defendant is not mentally retarded
within the meaning of other states' laws exempting mentally retarded
individuals from the death penalty. Therefore, assuming, for the sake of
argument only, that the Eighth Amendment precludes execution of the
mentally retarded, it does not render defendant's sentence in~alid."'~'
In light of the recent legislative changes and the recent state court
decisions, advocates seeking a death penalty exemption for the mentally
retarded need to determine if it would be effective to press the Supreme
Court to reconsider Penry at this time. Deciding this question requires
an examination of the justices' varying views on "national consensus"
and "evolving standards of decency."

A. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens is the only member of the Penry dissent still on the
Court. In Perzry, Justice Stevens simply stated that he found the execution of the mentally retarded unconstitutional. He did not discuss the
scope of "national consensus." It is reasonable to assume that he would
again conclude that the execution of the mentally retarded violates the
Eighth Amendment. Further, in the context of the execution of juveniles,
Justice Stevens has found that a national consensus exists to preclude

196. St~tirlrejr,978 P.2d at 1224.
197. Id. at 1225 n.1.
198. Id. at 1222.
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the execution of persons who were under the age of sixteen at the time
of the commission of the crime based on the eighteen death penalty
states that specifically exempt such youthful offenders from the death
penalty.199He also has found there is a national consensus barring the
execution of juveniles who were under the age of eighteen at the time of
the commission of the crime based on, among other factors, the twelve
death penalty states that bar such executions.200Thus, Justice Stevens
would likely find that the twelve states that currently exempt the mentally retarded from capital punishment are sufficient to constitute a national consensus.

B. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy all
agreed in Penry that in 1989 a national consensus did not exist to exempt the mentally retarded fiom the punishment of death.201These justices also have indicated that they are unwilling to examine whether a
punishment advances the goals of deterrence or retribution, or whether a
punishment is proportionate to the crime and the offender.202It appears
that the only argument that will sway these justices is the number of
states precluding a particular punishment in general or the infliction of
that punishment on a particular class of individuals.
On the same day as the Court decided Penry, Justice Scalia announced a plurality opinion in which the Court found that it did not violate the Eighth Amendment for a state to execute a person who was sixteen or seventeen at the time he committed his crime.203In determining
whether there existed objective criteria reflecting society's view with
regard to the execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, Justice
Scalia wrote:
Of the 37 States whose laws permit capital punishment, 15 decline to impose it upon 16-year-old offenders and 12 decline to
199. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the Court concluded that states could not execute anyone who was under the age of
sixteen at the time of the crime. Tllonipson, 487 U.S. at 838. The defendant in Tl~on~pson
was
William Wayne Thompson, who at the age of fifteen plotted with three companions to kill his
brother-in-law. Id. at 819. Thompson was tried as an adult, convicted of capital murder, and sentenced to death. Id. at 820. Although at the time of Thompson's trial Oklahoma had not established a minimum age for the imposition of the death penalty, eighteen other death penalty states
set a minimum age of at least sixteen. Id. at 829. Nineteen death penalty states, including Oklahoma, set no age limit on the imposition of the death penalty. Tllon~pson,487 U.S. at 826-27.
200. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 382-91 (1989) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, &
Stevens. JJ. dissenting).
201. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 351 (1989) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., &
Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202. Penry, 492 U.S. at 351.
203. Stanford, 492 U.S. 361.
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impose it on 17-year-old offenders. This does not establish the
degree of national consensus this Court has previously thou ht
sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and unusual.20%
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy agreed that these numbers
were insufficient to form a national consensus. Thus, twelve states were
insufficient to convince these justices that a national consensus existed
limiting the imposition of the death penalty on a seventeen-year-old.
Further, these justices declined to find that eighteen states constitute a
sufficient number to form a national consensus barring the infliction of
the death penalty on a certain class of defendant^.^" It is unlikely that
they will be persuaded by the twelve states that now ban the execution
of the mentally retarded to find that there is now a national consensus
exempting the mentally retarded from the death penalty.
C. Justice O'Connor
In Penry, Justice O'Connor left open the possibility that someday
the execution of the mentally retarded might violate the Eighth Amendment, provided that more states and/or sentencing juries indicate that
such punishment was out of step with the country's evolving standards
of decency. However, like Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Kennedy, it seems unlikely that the legislative changes of the past
eleven years will be sufficient to satisfy Justice O'Connor.
Justice O'Connor's views on the execution of juveniles is instructive
in determining how she may react to the legislative changes that have
occurred with respect to the execution of the mentally retarded. In the
year before the Court decided Peniy, Justice O'Connor stated that evidence showing that eighteen death penalty states exempted juveniles
under the age of sixteen from the death penalty was indicative of "a national consensus forbidding the execution" of such persons.206However,
Justice O'Connor was "reluctant to adopt this conclusion as a matter of
constitutional law without better evidence than we now possess. ,9207
Rather, Justice O'Connor took the unusual position of concluding that
the state legislature had not intended by its silence to include fifteenyear-olds among those criminal defendants who were death eligible. She
found that "[the] petitioner and others who were below the age of 16 at
the time of their offense may not be executed under the authority of a
capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at which the
204. Id. at 370-71 (footnote omitted).
205. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 867-68 (1988) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., &
White, J . dissenting).
206. Tl~on~pson,
487 U . S . at 848.
207. Id. at 849.

200 11

Mental Retardation and Death Eligibility

937

commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execution.~ ~ 2 0 8
In Stanford v. Kentucky, however, Justice O'Connor joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy in finding that the protection
that twelve death penalty states extended to seventeen-year-olds was
insufficient to compel the conclusion that such executions violated the
Eighth Amendment. Thus, it appears unlikely that Justice O'Connor
would view the current mental retardation exemption legislation as sufficient to signal a national consensus.

D. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas was not on the Supreme Court when Penry was decided. However, Justice Thomas has often aligned with Justice Scalia on
questions concerning the Eighth ~ m e n d m e n t : ~and
~ has taken restrictive
views of the protection that the Eighth Amendment provides in capital
sentencing proceedings.210It seems reasonable to conclude that Justice
Thomas would join in finding no national consensus exempting the mentally retarded from the punishment of death.

E. Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer
Likewise, Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer were not on the
bench when Penry was decided. These justices appear to hold views
more closely in keeping with Justice Stevens' positions on the Eighth
Amendment and capital sentencing
However, these justices have not ruled on an issue involving a "national consensus" in the
context of the Eighth Amendment or the death penalty, and they do not
always align themselves with Justice Stevens on questions involving
208. Id. at 857-58.
209. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 860 (1998) (joining Justice
Scalia in a concurring opinion regarding application of Eighth Amendment in a 42 U.S.C. 5 1983
excessive force case); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 37-42 (1993) (dissenting with Justice
Scalia and finding Eighth Amendment does not protect inmates from risk of harm); Hudson v.
McMillian. 503 U.S. 1, 17-29 (1992) (dissenting with Justice Scalia and finding that Eighth
Amendment is not applicable in cases challenging a prisoner's conditions of confinement or the
use of excessive force on a prisoner).
210. See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000) (joining Chief Justice Rehnquist in
finding capital sentencing jury instruction adequately advised jury of its duty to consider mitigating evidence); but see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (Thomas delivered the
opinion of the Court finding fine was excessive under the Eighth Amendment while Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia dissented).
21 1. See, e.g., Weeks, 528 U.S. at 237 (Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting);
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 405 (1999) (Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999) (Souter, Ginsburg, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting
to a denial of certiorari to address whether application of California's three strike rule to a person
who commits a misdemeanor violates the Eighth Amendment); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S.
269, 280 (1998) (Breyer, Stevens, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S.
151, 168-78 (1997) (Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting and finding fundamental
error occurred during capital sentencing proceedings).
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capital punishment."' Therefore, it is unclear how they would react to
an invitation to overturn Penry.

F. The Viability of Raising This Issue Before the Current Supreme
Court and Alternative Avenues for Achieving a National Ban on the
Execution of tlze Mentally Retarded
Unlike 1989, no member of the current Court is a death penalty abolitionist. While it is possible that Justices Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg
might join Justice Stevens in finding a national consensus precluding the
execution of the mentally retarded, it is not clear that these three justices
would take this position. Further, it seems doubtful that a majority of the
Court would find the states' present position on this issue sufficient to
support a national consensus. Hence, it would appear that raising this
issue before the Supreme Court in the hopes of crafting a death penalty
exclusion for the mentally retarded is likely to fail.
However, other, more viable avenues exist for seeking a national
ban on the execution of the mentally retarded. The most obvious (and to
date the most successful) is to seek relief with state legislatures. As
mentioned earlier, several states have bills currently pending that would
ban the execution of the mentally retarded. Moreover, the Governor of
Illinois has imposed a moratorium on the death penalty in his state. Although the Illinois moratorium focuses primarily on the grave risk that
an innocent person might be executed under the current death penalty
system, the risk of executing an innocent person is heightened in the
context of the mentally retarded defendant who is more likely to confess
to a crime he did not commit or to accept greater responsibility for a
criminal act than he actually de~erves."~
Further, given the potential
problems that a mentally retarded criminal defendant might have in
communicating with his lawyer, there is an increased risk that certain
defenses or mitigating evidence might not be explored."4 In light of
these factors, legislators might be more receptive to the need to protect
the mentally retarded defendant. Moreover, this issue resounds not only
with groups and individuals who traditionally oppose the death penalty,
but also with mental health organizations and the public at large. The
broader spectrum of political forces that oppose the execution of the
mentally retarded offer a greater chance of success in state legislatures.
212. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995). Justice Stevens dissented while Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined the majority's holding that the Eighth Amendment does
not require the State to define the weight the sentencing judge must give to an advisory jury verdict.
213. See sriprn text accompanying notes 63-68.
2 14. See srtprn text accompanying notes 69-7 1 .
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In addition to seeking a legislative exemption for the mentally retarded, advocates should also seek to use state constitutions to argue that
the execution of the mentally retarded offends the state's Eighth
Amendment equivalent. Although a state constitution must afford at
least as much protection to its citizens as does the federal constitution, a
state constitution may provide greater protection to defendants appearAs Justice Mosk stated in People v. Sinithey, the
ing before its c0urts.2~~
California prohibition on cruel or unusual punishmen?16 is broader than
the federal prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Mosk
would find that the execution of the mentally retarded offends the state
~onstitution.2~'Other state constitutions also forbid the imposition of
cruel or unusual punishments,218and it is possible, although clearly not
certain, that this distinction could provide greater protection to citizens
than the Eighth ~rnendment.2~'Other states provide, "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.9,220 This language likewise provides arguably broader
protection than the Eighth Amendment. Most other states employ the
"cruel and unusual punishment" language; however, advocates for mentally retarded criminal defendants should carefully review the state's
applicable case law for broader applications of this language.

V. CONCLUSION
Although it appears that the current Supreme Court may not be receptive to finding that a national consensus bars the execution of the
mentally retarded at this time, advocates who wish to spare the mentally
retarded from the death penalty should not despair. Rather, advocates
seeking to exempt the mentally retarded from capital punishment must
continue to seek relief in the state legislatures and courts. If these efforts
continue to be successful-as they have been thus far in twelve states215. James R. Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Cllnllenging the Dent11 Pennlty Under Sfnre Consfifufions.42 VAND.L. REV. 1299 (1989).
216. Article I, Section 17 of the California Constitution provides that "cruel and unusual
punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed."
217. See Lambert v. State, 984 P.2d 221,240-43 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (Chapel, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
218. The following states exclude "cruel or unusual" punishments: Alabama (ALA.CONST.art.
I, (j 15); Arkansas (ARK.CONST.art. 2, (j 9); Hawaii (HAWAII
CONST.art. 1, (j 12); Indiana (IND.
CONST. art. 1,s 16); Maine, ME. CONST. art. 1, (j 9); Massachusetts (MASS.CONST. pt. 1, art. 26);
Michigan (MICH. CONST.art. 1, (j 16); Minnesota (MINN.CONST.art. I , (j 5); Mississippi (MISS.
CONST. art. 3, (j 28); Nevada (NEv. CONST.art. 1, (j 6); New Hampshire (N.H. CONST.pt. I, art.
33); North Carolina (N.C. CONST. art. 1, (j 27); North Dakota (N.D. CONST.art. 1, (j l I); and
Oklahoma (OKLA.CONST.art. 1, (j 9). Further, Article 1, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution
provides, "No law shall subject any person to euthanasia, to torture, or to cruel, excessive, or
unusual punishment."
219. Acker & Walsh. s~cpmnote 215, at 1315-31.
220. DEL. CONST. art. 1, (j 11; KY. CONST.(j 17; PA. CONST.art. 1, (j 13; R.1. CONST. art. 1, Q:
8; S.D. CONST.art. 6, (j 23; WASH.CONST.art. I , $ 14; and S.C. CONST.art. I, (j 15.
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then, a majority of the Supreme Court will likely find that a national
consensus indeed exists and that the execution of the mentally retarded
is a barbaric form of punishment prohibited under the Eighth Amendment.

The Supreme Court remanded Penry for re-sentencing so that a jury
could fully consider his mental retardation as a factor mitigating the
imposition of the death penalty. Despite this mitigating evidence, a
Texas jury was not persuaded to spare Penry, and Penry again was sentenced to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Penry's
conviction and sentence? and the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas denied Penry's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Penry was scheduled for execution on January 13, 2 0 0 0 . ~The
~~
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a stay of execution pending review of Penry's motion for a certificate of appealability appealing the
federal district court's denial of habeas relief. On June 20, 2000, the
Circuit Court of Appeals denied Penry's certificate of appealability and
upheld the federal district court's denial of habeas re~ief."~
On November 27, 2000, after the writing of this Article, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two questions regarding
Penry's second trial. First, the Court will consider whether the jury instructions allowed adequate consideration of Penry's mental retardation
as a factor mitigating against the imposition of the death penalty. Second, the Court will examine whether Penry's Fifth Amendment rights
were violated during the course of the state court proceedings. The
Court did not state that it intended to revisit the question of whether the
execution of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth ~ m e n d m e n t . " ~
Johnny Paul Penry continues to await execution on Texas' death row.
However, on March 26, 2001 the Court granted certiorari in McCawer
v. North ~arolina,2'~
to address specifically the question of whether the
execution of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment.
Since the writing of this Article, South Dakota has joined those death
penalty states barring the execution of the mentally retarded so that now
221. Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
222. Jamie Fellner, Mentnlly Rernrdecl Defendants Don 'I Belong on Death Row, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 4,2000, at A 19.
223. Penry v. Johnson, 215 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 2000). By a vote of two-to-one, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the lower federal court's denial of habeas relief. Circuit Court Judge
Dennis dissented on the grounds that the Texas death penalty scheme still did not allow the jury to
give effect to Penry's mitigating evidence regarding his mental retardation and history of childhood abuse. Penry, 215 F.3d at 514-1 6.
224. See Penry v. Johnson, 121 S. Ct. 563 (2000).
225. No. 2001 W L 215804 (March 26,2001).
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thirteen states and the federal government exclude the mentally retarded
from the punishment of death.

